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Do people desire creative ideas? Most scholars would answer 
this question with an obvious “yes,” asserting that creativity is 
the engine of scientific discovery and the fundamental driving 
force of positive change (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Fur-
thermore, creativity is seen as being associated with intelli-
gence, wisdom, and moral goodness (Niu & Sternberg, 2006; 
Sternberg, 1985). However, although people strongly endorse 
this positive view of creativity, scholars have long been puz-
zled by the finding that organizations, scientific institutions, 
and decision makers routinely reject creative ideas, even when 
espousing creativity as an important goal (Staw, 1995). Simi-
larly, research has documented that teachers dislike students 
who exhibit curiosity and creative thinking, even though 
teachers acknowledge creativity as an important educational 
goal (Westby & Dawson, 1995).
We offer a new perspective to explain this puzzle. Just as 
people have deeply rooted biases against people of a certain 
age, race, or gender that are not necessarily overt (Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995), so too can people hold deeply rooted nega-
tive views of creativity that are not openly acknowledged. 
Revealing the existence and nature of a bias against creativity 
can help explain why people might reject creative ideas and 
stifle scientific advancement, even in the face of strong inten-
tions to the contrary.
Creative ideas are both novel and useful (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010), and novelty is the key distinguishing feature 
of creativity beyond ideas that are merely well conceived. Yet 
the requirement that creative ideas contain novelty can also 
promote a tension in evaluators’ minds when they judge 
whether to pursue an idea. Indeed, evaluators have a hard time 
viewing novelty and practicality as attributes that go hand in 
hand, often viewing them as inversely related (Rietzschel, 
Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2009). There are several reasons why. 
Practical ideas are generally valued (Sanchez-Burks, 2005). 
However, the more novel an idea, the more uncertainty can 
exist about whether the idea is practical, useful, error free, and 
reliably reproducible (Amabile, 1996). When endorsing a 
novel idea, people can experience failure (Simonton, 1984), 
social rejection (Nemeth, 1986), and uncertainty about when 
their idea will reach completion (Metcalfe, 1986). Uncertainty 
is an aversive state (Heider, 1958) that people feel a strong 
motivation to diminish and avoid (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
Hence, people can also have negative associations with nov-
elty—an attribute at the heart of what makes ideas creative in 
the first place.
Although positive associations with creativity are typically 
the focus of attention among both scholars and practitioners, 
negative associations may also be activated when people eval-
uate a creative idea. For example, research on associative 
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thinking suggests that strong uncertainty feelings may make 
the negative attributes of creativity, particularly those related 
to uncertainty, more salient (Bower, 1981).
This evaluative process is not necessarily overt, which 
makes the bias against creativity potentially insidious. In fact, 
there is often strong normative pressure to endorse creative 
ideas (Flynn & Chatman, 2001) and a strong social desirability 
bias against expressing any view of creativity as negative 
(Runco, 2010). This resulting state is similar to that identified 
in research on racial bias: There is a conflict between an 
explicit preference toward creativity and unacknowledged 
negative associations with creativity (much as there can be a 
conflict between explicit and implicit attitudes toward a spe-
cific social group; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In other words, 
uncovering a bias against creative ideas requires a method more 
subtle than simply asking directly. Therefore, we decided to 
employ a measure that assesses explicit attitudes in addition to 
implicit attitudes, which are less susceptible to self-presentation 
biases and normative pressures (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhl-
mann, & Banaji, 2009). In two studies, we tested whether 
uncertainty measured and manipulated in two different ways 
promotes a greater bias against creativity relative to practical-
ity. In the second study, we investigated whether this bias 
deters peoples’ ability to recognize creative ideas.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design. Participants (N = 73) were ran-
domly assigned to one of two conditions: uncertainty (n = 28) 
or baseline (n = 45). Fifty-one percent of the participants were 
men, and 49% were women (mean age = 22.74 years). Each 
participant took both an implicit and an explicit attitude test to 
assess his or her bias against creativity relative to his or her 
bias against practicality.
Procedure and materials. Participants in the uncertainty 
condition were told that they might receive additional pay-
ment, but this would be determined by a random lottery rather 
than by their performance. Participants in the baseline condi-
tion were not given the opportunity to receive extra money. A 
pilot study (N = 82) verified that the uncertainty manipulation 
evoked significantly higher uncertainty feelings than did the 
baseline condition. All participants completed the Openness to 
Experience subscale of the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992), a trait that is highly related to creativity 
(Feist, 1998).
Participants’ automatic mental associations with creativity 
and practicality were assessed using the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). This 
measure relies on test takers’ speed of response to determine 
the strength of their mental associations. The IAT measures 
participants’ reaction times when categorizing stimuli from 
four categories. In this experiment, the categories consisted of 
two attitude objects (creativity or practicality) and two 
evaluative dimensions (good or bad). In the computerized ver-
sion of the IAT, participants press a key on the left of the key-
board in response to items from two paired categories (e.g., 
creativity + bad) and a key on the right of the keyboard in 
response to items from another pair (e.g., practicality + good). 
The categories assigned to the same response key vary between 
blocks. The speed of response in the blocks with one category 
pairing is compared with the speed of response in the blocks 
with the opposite category pairing, and this comparison is 
used to derive an index of the subject’s implicit bias.
Our IAT used words related to creativity (e.g., novel, cre-
ative, inventive, original) and practicality (e.g., practical, 
functional, constructive, and useful), as well as words that 
named good things (rainbow, cake, sunshine, laughter, peace, 
heaven) and bad things (vomit, hell, agony, rotten, poison, 
ugly). Block order was counterbalanced such that half of the 
participants performed the creative + good component first, 
and the other half performed the creative + bad component 
first. The IAT score was calculated by subtracting response 
latencies for the creative + good blocks from response laten-
cies for the creative + bad blocks; higher values indicate more 
bias against creativity relative to practicality. We scored the 
IAT using the D statistic (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), 
a method less influenced by procedural variables, such as 
order or counterbalancing, and cognitive ability than standard 
scoring methods for the IAT are (Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & 
McFarland, 2004).
Participants also explicitly rated their positive and negative 
feelings toward creativity- and practicality-related words on 
7-point scales (1 = strongly negative, 4 = neutral, 7 = strongly
positive). Words associated with creativity included creative,
inventive, original, and novel (α = .77), and words associated
with practicality included practical, functional, constructive,
useful (α = .88). Participants indicated positive associations
(i.e., above the scale midpoint) with both creativity-related
words (M = 5.37, SD = 0.75) and practicality-related words
(M = 5.43, SD = 0.91). Explicit-bias scores were calculated by
subtracting ratings for creativity-related words from ratings
for practicality-related words (M = 0.06, SD = 0.91). (See the
Supplemental Material available online for additional details
regarding Experiment 1 and a pilot study.)
Results and discussion
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations among all 
major variables. An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) con-
trolling for openness to experience revealed no significant dif-
ferences in explicit bias between the uncertainty condition 
(M = 0.02, SD = 0.83) and the baseline condition (M = −0.11, 
SD = 0.96), F(1, 70) = 0.07, p = .78. However, a second 
ANCOVA that also controlled for openness to experience 
revealed that participants in the uncertainty condition showed 
an implicit bias against creativity relative to practicality (M = 
0.15, SD = 0.54); this finding significantly differed from the 
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results of participants in the baseline condition, who showed 
an implicit bias in favor of creativity relative to practicality 
(M = −0.23, SD = 0.47), F(1, 70) = 13.13, p = .001; condition 
accounted for 11% of the variance in implicit bias.
The results of Experiment 1 show that people hold ambiva-
lent attitudes toward creativity. Although participants in the 
baseline condition evidenced positive implicit associations 
with creativity relative to practicality, participants in the 
uncertainty condition exhibited an implicit bias against cre-
ativity relative to practicality. In Experiment 2, we wished to 
extend these findings to show that people’s motivation to 
reduce uncertainty when solving a problem can activate the 
creativity bias. Specifically, scholars propose that effective 
and creative problem solving includes both generating many 
novel options and subsequently reducing uncertainty by iden-
tifying the single best option from the set (Cropley, 2006). We 
propose that this latter orientation toward identifying the opti-
mal solution may prime an uncertainty-reduction motive or 
intolerance for uncertainty and thereby evoke the creativity 
bias. Additionally, we explored whether the creativity bias 
might also deter the recognition of a creative idea.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants and design. One hundred forty undergraduate 
students (55% female, 45% male; mean age = 20.66 years) 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: high toler-
ance for uncertainty (n = 70) and low tolerance for uncertainty 
(n = 70).
Procedure and materials. Before exposure to the experimen-
tal manipulation, participants took the Openness to Experience 
subscale. Participants in the high-tolerance-for-uncertainty con-
dition were then told to write an essay supporting the statement, 
“For every problem, there is more than one correct solution.” 
Participants in the low-tolerance-for-uncertainty condition were 
asked to write an essay supporting the statement, “For every 
problem, there is only one correct solution.” After being exposed 
to the experimental manipulation, each participant took the 
same implicit and explicit creativity versus practicality bias 
tests used in Experiment 1.
Subsequently, participants were asked to rate a creative 
idea (a running shoe with nanotechnology that adjusts fabric 
thickness to cool the foot and reduce blisters). We pretested 
this idea using a different sample of undergraduates (N = 36), 
who rated this idea as being highly creative (M = 5.82, SD = 
0.80), novel (M = 5.62, SD = 1.02), and practical (M = 5.85, 
SD = 0.92) on 7-point scales ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, 
extremely so. Participants in the main experiment rated the 
idea using the creativity scale, which employed the same six 
words related to creativity used in both the implicit and explicit 
bias tests (M = 5.41, SD = 1.05; α = .78).
In addition, a three-item manipulation check assessed par-
ticipants’ uncertainty when evaluating the running-shoe idea 
(e.g., “I feel uncertain about this idea”); the response scale 
ranged from 1, not at all, to 7, very much so (α = .78). Partici-
pants in the low-tolerance condition were significantly more 
uncertain (M = 4.36, SD = 1.23) than those in the high- 
tolerance condition (M = 3.87, SD = 1.33), F(1, 133) = 5.14, 
p = .025. (See the Supplemental Material for additional details 
regarding Experiment 2, a pilot study, and one additional study.)
Results and discussion
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics and correlations among all 
major variables. An ANCOVA controlling for openness to 
experience revealed that participants in the low-tolerance-for-
uncertainty condition were not significantly different in their 
level of explicit bias against creativity (M = 0.20, SD = 
0.81) compared with participants in the high-tolerance-for- 
uncertainty condition (M = 0.22, SD = 0.94), F(1, 133) = 0.14, 
p = .71. However, a second ANCOVA controlling for openness 
to experience revealed that participants in the low-tolerance 
condition were more implicitly biased against creativity relative 
to practicality (M = 0.07, SD = 0.43) than participants in the 
high-tolerance condition were (M = −0.16, SD = 0.46), F(1, 
133) = 7.87, p = .007; participants in the high-tolerance condi-
tion exhibited positive associations with creativity relative to
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among All Variables in 
Experiment 1
Correlations
Variable M     1 2 3
1. Openness to experience 4.01 (0.65)
2. Condition (1 = uncertainty, 
0 = baseline)
.38 (.43) .11
3. Explicit bias 0.06 (0.91) −.32** −.07
4. Implicit bias −0.09 (0.53) −.25** .35** .29*
Note: N = 73. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Twenty-eight participants 
were in the uncertainty condition, and 45 participants were in the baseline condition.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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practicality. A third ANCOVA controlling for openness to 
experience identified that participants in the low-tolerance 
condition rated the running-shoe idea as less creative (M = 
5.06, SD = 1.06) than participants in the high-tolerance condi-
tion did (M = 5.76, SD = 0.93), F(1, 137) = 15.48, p = .000.
A hierarchical regression showed that the relationship 
between experimental condition and creativity ratings, β = 
−0.64, t(134) = −3.81, p < .001, became less significant when 
implicit bias was included in the model, β = −0.56, t(134) = 
−3.30, p < .01. A bootstrap analysis of the indirect effect of 
condition on creativity ratings through implicit bias yielded a 
95% confidence interval of [−.24, −.02], which did not include 
zero; this result demonstrated partial mediation (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). Mediation analyses controlling for both explicit 
bias and openness to experience at each step indicated that 
relatively lower levels of uncertainty tolerance led to higher 
levels of implicit bias, which in turn contributed to lower rat-
ings of creativity when controlling for participants’ explicit 
bias and general openness to experience.
The results of Experiment 2 both replicated the finding that 
uncertainty promotes negative associations with creativity 
relative to practicality and extended this finding by showing 
that the bias against creativity interfered with participants’ 
ability to recognize a creative idea.
General Discussion
Robert Goddard, the father of modern rocket propulsion, 
endured ridicule and derision from his contemporary scientific 
peers, who stated that his ideas were ludicrous and impossible. 
This example is not unique, but it would puzzle creativity the-
orists, as research shows that expert raters who are themselves 
creative are even more likely to accurately recognize and 
assess creativity than expert raters who are less creative 
(Hennessey, Amabile, & Mueller, 2011). Our results show that 
regardless of the degree to which people are open minded, 
when they feel motivated to reduce uncertainty (either because 
they have an immediate goal of reducing uncertainty or they 
feel uncertain generally), they may experience more negative 
associations with creativity, which results in lower evaluations 
of a creative idea. Our findings imply a deep irony. Prior 
research shows that uncertainty spurs the search for and gen-
eration of creative ideas (Audia & Goncalo, 2007), yet our 
findings reveal that uncertainty also makes people less able to 
recognize creativity, perhaps when they need it most.
Beyond merely having a preference for the status quo or 
for familiar ideas (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; 
Zajonc, 2001), people appear to have ambivalent feelings 
toward creativity. On the one hand, participants in the 
baseline condition of Experiment 1 and the high-tolerance-for- 
uncertainty condition of Experiment 2 demonstrated positive 
implicit associations with creativity relative to practicality. 
Additionally, 95% of participants in the uncertainty condition 
of Experiment 1 and the low-tolerance-for-uncertainty condi-
tion of Experiment 2 rated their explicit attitudes toward 
creativity-related words as positive—higher than 4, the mid-
point of a 7-point scale; these ratings were statistically equiva-
lent to the ratings of attitudes toward practicality-related words.
On the other hand, the implicit measure showed that partici-
pants in each high-uncertainty condition (i.e., the uncertainty 
condition of Experiment 1 and the low-tolerance condition of 
Experiment 2) associated words such as “vomit,” “poison,” and 
“agony” with creativity more than with practicality. Because 
there is such a strong social norm to endorse creativity, and peo-
ple also feel authentic positive attitudes toward creativity, peo-
ple may be reluctant to admit that they do not want creativity; 
hence, the bias against creativity may be particularly slippery to 
diagnose. The implicit measures may have picked up negative 
associations with creativity under conditions of uncertainty 
because the methodology is more resistant to social desirability 
bias (Greenwald et al., 2009).
If people hold an implicit bias against creativity, then we 
cannot assume that organizations, institutions, or even scien-
tific endeavors will desire and recognize creative ideas even 
when they explicitly state that they want them. This is because 
when journals extol creative research, universities train scien-
tists to promote creative solutions, research and development 
companies commend the development of new products, and 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among All Variables in Experiment 2
Correlations
Variable M 1 2   3 4 5
1. Openness to experience 5.59 (0.99)
2. Condition (1 = low tolerance for uncertainty,  
0 = high tolerance for uncertainty)
.50 (.50) −.08
3. Uncertainty feelings when evaluating an idea 4.12 (1.30) −.04 .20*
4. Explicit bias 0.21 (0.87) −.23** −.01 .01
5. Implicit bias −0.05 (0.46) −.34** .25** −.13 .20*
6. Creativity rating 5.41 (1.05) .20* −.33** −.01 −.24** −.33**
Note: N = 140. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Seventy participants were in the low-tolerance-for-uncertainty condition, and 
70 participants were in the high-tolerance-for-uncertainty condition.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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pharmaceutical companies praise creative medical break-
throughs, they may do so in ways that promote uncertainty by 
requiring gatekeepers to identify the single “best” and most 
“accurate” idea, thereby creating an unacknowledged aversion 
to creativity. In addition, our results suggest that if people have 
difficulty gaining acceptance for creative ideas, especially 
when more practical and unoriginal options are readily avail-
able, the field of creativity may need to shift its current focus 
from identifying how to generate more creative ideas to iden-
tifying how to help innovative institutions recognize and 
accept creativity. Future research should identify factors that 
mitigate or reverse the bias against creativity.
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